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NOTES
Eminent Domain-Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.: Permanent Physical Occupation as a Taking
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the tak-

ing of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation.' For many years, courts have struggled to determine when, if ever, a

governmental interference with land is a "taking."'2 That this attempt has
been less than successful is suggested by one commentator's observation that
"in truth, the collected decisions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts,
leave the subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat."' 3 Recent cases seemed to

4
suggest that the Supreme Court was moving toward a unified taking doctrine.

In Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp.,5 the Court had to decide

whether to continue this evolution, or to retain a two-track approach that distinguishes physical invasions from other governmental interferences with land
use.
The particular issue in Loretto, as formulated by Justice Marshall, was

"whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property
authorized by government constitutes a 'taking' of property for which just
compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-

stitution." 6 By holding in a 6-3 opinion 7 that any permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking, regardless of the public interest it
may serve, 8 the Court reaffirmed its two-track approach and signalled its unwillingness to hasten the evolution of a unified theory.

Loretto involved a challenge by a New York City landlord to a New York
State statute 9 that prohibited landlords from interfering with the installation
*1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." This prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971);
Stoebuck, Police Power,Takings andDueProcess, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1058-59 (1980).
3. Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1059 n. 11.
4. See especially Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979).
5. 102 S.Ct. 3164 (1982).
6. Id at 3168.
7. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined Justice Marshall in the majority. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Brennan and White joined.
8. 102 S.Ct. at 3171.
9. N.Y. Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney 1982), which provides in part:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or
premises, except that a landlord may require:

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

of cable television facilities on their premises.10 The New York Court of Appeals"I upheld the statute against a taking challenge' 2 after holding that it was
a legitimate exercise of the police power. 13 While it did not disturb the New
York court's determination that facilitating cable television was a valid public
purpose, 14 the United States Supreme Court5reversed on the grounds that the
application of the statute effected a taking.'
Historically, two types of governmental interferences with land use have
been subject to taking analyses: physical invasions and nonpossessory regulations on use. 16 As a general rule, any physical invasion of an owner's property
by the government has been considered a taking. 17 Because the impairment in
use caused by an invasion was substantially identical to that resulting from a
i.

that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reasonable

conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning, and appearance of the
premises, and the convenience and well-being of other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination thereof
bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such facilites; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for any
damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities.
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for permitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from any
cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount which the
commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or
c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants who receive cable
television and those who do not.
Prior to the enactment of § 828 in 1973, Teleprompter routinely obtained authorizations for
its installations from property owners along the cable's route, compensating owners at a standard
rate of 5%of the gross revenues that Teleprompter realized from that particular property. Loretto,
102 S. Ct. at 3169.
Pursuant to § 828(l)(b), the state commission ruled that a one-time $1 payment is the normal
fee to which the landlord is entitled. Id at 3170.
10. The installation on plaintiff Loretto's building involved approximately 36 feet of cable
one-half inch in diameter (which ran along the length of the building 18 inches above the roof and
connected to the neighboring building), and two metal boxes, each occupying four cubic inches.
When Loretto purchased the property, she was unaware of the existence of the cable. Two years
after her purchase, Teleprompter dropped an additional cable down the front of the building to
provide cable television services to one of her tenants. Id at 3169-70.
11. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423 N.E.2d 320, 440
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981).
12. Id at 151, 423 N.E.2d at 334, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
13. The court noted that the statute served the public purpose of facilitating "rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important educational and community aspects." Id at 143-44, 423 N.E.2d at 329, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
14. Loretto, 102 S.Ct. at 3171.
15. Id at 3179.
16. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964).

17. Among several cases supporting this proposition are those involving flooding, see, e.g.,
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (government dam caused flooding of plaintiff's land,
held that substantial invasion caused by flood waters amounted to a taking); Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (same); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S.
799 (1950) (destruction of agricultural value caused by flooding above highwater mark held compensable as taking); utility lines, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540
(1904) (telegraph company had no right of eminent domain to construct and operate its lines on
railroad's property without railroad's consent; Court assumed that such an invasion would be
compensable as a taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (city had power
to require telegraph company to pay for the exclusive, permanent use of space on poles); and
airplane overflights, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (frequent low altitude
flights above landowner's property constituted a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
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formal appropriation, courts believed that the government should compensate
the owner as if it had formally appropriated the land.' 8
In contrast to their relative inflexibility toward physical invasions, courts
have adopted two views with respect to the regulation of land use.' 9 The ear20
lier view was that the regulation of a "noxious" use was never a taking.
Courts reasoned that there could be no taking in these cases, either because
there was no appropriation of a proprietary interest (in contrast to the physical
invasion cases), 2 1 or because uses in contravention of the public interest were
22
not property interests protected by the Constitution.
A second view, not necessarily inconsistent with the first, was elucidated
in Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:23 a
regulation that went "too far" would be a taking.24 The standard for determining whether a regulation crossed this amorphous boundary was the extent
of the diminution in value caused by the government's action.2 5 Holmes took
26
a narrow view of the property interest affected by the government's action,
and suggested that a taking was less likely to be found if a landowner burdened by a governmental action received a reciprocal benefit flowing from
27
that action.
Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York 28 represented a watershed
in the Supreme Court's thinking about taking jurisprudence. After stating that
it had developed no "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness"
required that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
government, rather than remaining disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons, the Court identified several factors that should aid in making these
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. ' 29 The Court focused on the economic
impact of the regulation, considering particularly the extent to which the regu(1946) (same). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1165, 1184 (1967).
18. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1185-86.
19. See Sax, supra note 16, at 37-42; Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1062, 1069-70.
20. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding regulation forbidding sale
and manufacture of intoxicating liquors). See also Sax, supra note 16, at 38-40.
21. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
22. See Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1905) (holding that property rights in
hauling and disposing of garbage were not protected by the Constitution against de facto destruction by a regulation making such activities public nuisances).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding mining of coal that would remove the subadjacent
support from surface housing held an impermissible exercise of the police power when owners of

surface had failed to acquire subadjacent rights).
24. Id at 415.
25. Id at 413.
26. Holmes focused on the narrow right to mine coal under the particular house in question,
rather than the right to mine coal on the entirety of the property. Id at 413-14.
27. Holmes expressed this notion in terms of "an average reciprocity of advantage." Id at
415.
28. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved the application of New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law to Grand Central Station. Although its effect was to prohibit the
owners of Grand Central from developing the airspace over the terminal, the Court ruled that the
application of the law was not a taking.
29. Id at 123-24.
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lation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the

character of the government's action. 30 In justifying this rule, the Court rejected the notion that an individual should be asked to bear a disproportionate
part of the cost for a public benefit only when he has done something "wrong"
(the "noxious use" test),3 1 or when he will receive a reciprocal benefit to miti-

gate his loss (Holmes' "reciprocity of advantage"). 32 The Court also limited
the Pennsylvania Coal diminution of value standard by incorporating that

standard as only one factor in the multi-factor balancing test, and by taking a
much broader view of the property interest affected by the government's ac33
tion than that taken by Holmes.
Because Penn Central did not involve a physical invasion, it was unclear
from that case whether the move away from historical per se rules and toward
a unified theory based on an all-inclusive, multi-factor balancing test would be
extended to physical invasion cases as well. By observing in dicta that "a 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion. . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good," 34 the Court in Penn Central appeared to leave

open the possibility that a physical invasion could be accorded special weight
in the balancing process without being determinative. Two cases decided after
Penn Central seemed to suggest that the Court would continue its movement
toward a unified doctrine.
30. Id at 124. In applying these factors, the Court determined that since the owner was able
to continue to enjoy a reasonable return after the enactment of the regulation, it did not suffer a
significant loss or any substantial interference with investment-backed expectations. Id at 136. In
addition, the Court was less hesitant to uphold the governmental action since it was a regulation
ratJer than a physical invasion. See id. at 130.
31. The Court cited three cases as standing for the proposition that use regulations may be
upheld if they are "reasonably related to the implementation of a policy. . . expected to produce
a widespread benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." See 1d at 133-34 n.30,
These cases were Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (statute requiring that the operation of an existing brickyard within the city limits be terminated upheld as valid exercise of the
police power, even though its application diminished value of owner's property from $800,000 to
$60,000); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upheld order of state entomologist requiring
plaintiffs to cut down ornamental red cedar trees that contained a pest harmful to apple trees;
compensation was limited to cost of removal); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (upheld regulation prohibiting excavations below the water table; effect was to prevent
present and presumably most beneficial use of the land). By denying that the decisions in these
cases were based on a determination that the uses involved were "noxious," when the Court had
previously characterized them as such, the Court was rejecting the noxious use rule. See Penn
Central,438 U.S. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. The owner of Grand Central Station was forced to accept a burden greater than the
benefit it received, and its use was not a noxious one. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 133-34. See also
id at 147-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. The Court stated:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....
Id at 130-31.
34. Id at 124 (citations omitted).
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In Kaiser Aetna v. United States35 the owner of a nonnavigable pond
wanted to convert it into a marina by connecting it to a navigable bay. After
obtaining the government's approval, the owner, at his own expense, dredged
a channel between the two bodies of water. The government argued that it
should be able to enjoy a navigational servitude over the now navigable (formerly pond) waters without paying compensation. In deciding that the actual
physical invasion resulting from the enjoyment of the servitude would effect a
taking, the Court acknowledged the applicability of the Penn Central ad hoc
test, 36 noted that the owner's significant investment was based on his reasonable expectation that the completed marina would remain private, 37 and accorded special weight to the character of the government's action (a physical
invasion), which would have deprived the owner of his fundamental "right to
38
exclude."
In PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins 39 the Court applied the Penn Central test in upholding a state constitutional requirement that shopping center
owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on property to which the owners had already invited the general public.4° The Court
noted that given the importance of protecting the first amendment rights at
issue, the mere fact
of a physical invasion could not be determinative of the
41
taking question.
Thus was the stage set for the Court's decision in Loretto. While acknowledging the use of the Penn Central balancing test in recent cases, the
Court concluded that when the character of the government's action rises to
the level of a "permanent physical occupation," no balancing is permitted: a
permanent physical occupation is a taking per se.42 The basis for the Court's
holding was its view that permanent physical occupations are qualitatively
more severe than other governmental interferences with land use because they
destroy three fundamental property rights: the rights to possess, use, and dispose of a physical thing. 43 In support for its per se rule, the majority cited as
precedent those cases on which the historical physical invasion rule had been
based. 44 It cited Kaiser Aetna for the proposition that the "right to exclude"
was qualitatively superior to other rights and thus entitled to special protection, and distinguished KaiserAetna's holding that a physical invasion was not
determinative by drawing a distinction between "invasions" and "occupations." 45 The Court distinguished Pruneyard'sholding that a physical inva35. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
36. Id at 174-75.
37. Id at 179.
38. Id at 179-80.
39. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
40. Id at 83-84.
41. Id
42. Loretto, 102 S.Ct. at 3171.
43. Id at 3176-77.
44. Id at 3171-74 (citing, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903)).
45. Id at 3175.
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sion was not determinative
by drawing a distinction between "temporary" and
46
"permanent" invasions.
The Loretto dissent contains two basic themes: an affirmation that the
full Penn Central balancing test should have been applied to the facts of
Loretto, with a resulting determination that section 828 did not effect a taking;
and an attack on both the fundamental soundness of the majority's rule and its
particular application to the facts of Loretto.
Applying the Penn Central test, the dissenters would have found no taking in Loretto because: (1) the statute served the valid public purpose of facilitating tenant access to cable television; (2) as in Pruneyard,the fact of a minor
physical intrusion should not have been determinative; (3) the application of
the statute had minimal economic impact because it did not affect the owner's
"fair return" on her property; and (4) as Loretto had been unaware of the
cable's presence at the time she purchased the building, there was no interfer47
ence with any investment-backed expectations.
The dissenters attacked the majority's rule as "anachronistic," 48 and expressed their fear that by carving out a niche for permanent physical occupations, the majority was inviting wasteful litigation over the meanings of these
terms and encouraging the manipulation of fact patterns to take advantage of
the rule.49 While not challenging the majority's determination that the fundamental rights to possess, use, and dispose of property were entitled to special
protection, the dissenters contended that section 828 did not affect these rights
any differently than they were affected by other regulations that require landlords to suffer some physical occupation of their property without compensation.5 o They argued that Loretto did not lose any of her fundamental rights
through the operation of section 828; rather, the intrusions of section 828
should have been viewed as ones Loretto chose to endure when she made the
choice to be a landlord. 5 ' Furthermore, they noted that if Loretto chose to
make some other use of her property, the installation of the cable pursuant to
section 828 would cease to be permanent.5 2
If an analysis of consistency is limited to an inquiry into whether a similar
rule was applied to similar facts in the past, the holding in Loretto finds some
support in precedent. To the extent that the earliest cases on which the physical invasion rule was based 53 are viewed as ones involving permanent physical
46. Id
47. Id at 3180-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Precisely because the extent to which the government may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not it has authorized a
.physical contact,' the Court has avoided per se taking rules resting on outmoded distinctions
between physical and nonphysical intrusions." Id at 3182 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 3184 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 3184-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Examples of such regulations would be those
requiring utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, and fire extinguishers.

51. Id at 3184-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 3185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Eg., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1949); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
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occupations, Loretto, involving a permanent physical occupation, is consistent
with them. 54 In addition, Loretto arguably is not inconsistent with Penn Central,KaiserAetna or Pruneyard: Penn Central is distinguishable as a case involving only a regulation on use (rather than an occupation); KaiserAetna and
Pruneyard are distinguishable because they are respectively defined as involving an invasion (rather than an occupation) that was temporary (rather than
permanent).
A more sophisticated analysis of consistency, focusing on the Court's reasoning instead of on factual similarities, supports several criticisms of the
Loretto per se rule. First, the Court may have misapplied the cases on which
the physical invasion rule was based 55 by using them to support its critical
proposition that occupations are qualitatively more severe than other governmental interferences with land use. 56 The decisions in these cases were based
instead on the theory that because the impairment in use caused by such invasion was substantially identical to that resulting from a formal appropriation,
should compensate the owner as if it had formally approprithe government
57
ated the land.
Second, Loretto is inconsistent with Penn Central to the extent that the
holding in Penn Centralrepresents a considered judgment that takings are better analyzed in terms of a multi-factor balancing test; a test in which factors
that had been considered determinative under per se rules become considerations to be weighed in determining overall fairness. Thus, the Loretto per se
rule, which refuses to allow the fact of a permanent physical occupation to be
less than determinative, fails to follow the Penn Central approach.
Finally, Loretto is inconsistent with the approach followed in Kaiser
Aetna and Pruneyard,in which the Court accorded special weight in the balancing process to the fact of physical invasion without making it determinative. In Kaiser Aetna the balance was between the owner's right to exclude
and the public's right of access under the navigational servitude. 58 In
Pruneyard the balance was between the right to exclude and the public's right
to enjoy its first amendment rights.59 To be consistent with this approach, the
Loretto Court would have had to frame its task in terms of balancing the right
to exclude against the right of unencumbered tenant access to cable television
(or against the larger policy consideration of state regulation of landlord-tenant relations).
The soundness of the Court's per se rule also may be criticized. The rule
54. If these cases are seen as not distinguishing between invasions and occupations, they may
arguably have been overruled by Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), and
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 3541.
55. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). See supra note
17.
56. Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3176.
57. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1185-86.
58. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79.
59. Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 83-84.
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suffers from the fault of any per se rule: it invites the proliferation of litigation
60
as parties attempt to manipulate their facts to take advantage of the rule;
and it encourages the growth of exceptions to the rule when a court wishes to
reach a different result on almost identical facts. More importantly, the twotrack approach signalled by Loretto reflects the Court's insensitivity to the role
that taking jurisprudence should play in a free society.
The essence of taking law is fairness. But a determination of when a governmental action is a taking should depend on more than whether it is fair to
ask a particular owner to bear a disproportionate cost for a particular public
benefit. Problems develop when a court addresses the question of fairness to
the individual without considering how that action affects the fairness of its
actions toward other individuals.
Something seems appealing about a doctrine which holds that the rights
to possess, use, and dispose of a thing are particularly precious, and are to be
accorded special weight in deciding if a governmental action that destroys
them is a taking. Yet something seems wrong when that same doctrine compensates a landlord for losing the use of one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on
her building, 6 1 but denies compensation to another owner who has lost the
right to develop (at substantial profit) the airspace over its railroad terminal
building. 62 The effect of combining the Loretto per se rule, which protects an
owner if the government permanently physically occupies his land, 63 and the
Court's philosophy in Penn Central that an individual may be asked to bear
disproportionately the cost of a governmental regulation which effects a public
benefit, 64 is the emergence of a taking doctrine that is manifestly unfair to
those asked to bear the burdens of public regulation.
A unified taking doctrine, based upon a multi-factor balancing test in
which physical occupations are important without being determinative, has
the flexibility and sensitivity to deal with this problem.
Under this doctrine, a case involving both an actual physical invasion
(occupation), and a large diminution in value or interference with investmentbacked expectations would almost always be considered a taking. 65 A case
involving a governmental regulation that causes minimal economic loss or
does not interfere with investment-backed expectations would almost never be
a taking. The cases in the middle, those involving governmental regulations
that cause significant diminutions in value 66 and those involving physical invasions (occupations) with little economic impact, 67 are less certain. But instead of drawing a line between them, a unified doctrine would treat them
together, asking: "How much of the burden for a particular public benefit
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3184 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
As in Loretto.
As in Penn Central.
Loretto, 102 S.Ct. at 3179.
See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
E.g., KaiserAetna.
Eg., Penn Central.
Eg., Loretto and Pruneyard.
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should an individual bear, given that other individuals affected by governmental action are suffering 'X' amount?"
While this framework does not dissolve the tension between Penn Central,
which upheld a regulation that caused a significant diminution in value, 68 and
Loretto, which found a taking even though its minimal physical occupation
had little economic impact,69 it points the way toward a logical reconciliation.
To ensure that owners who are affected by governmental regulations are
treated the same as owners who suffer physical invasions by government, the
Court must either: (1) increase the significance of diminution in value in regulation cases (making it more likely a taking will be found); (2) decrease the
significance of permanent occupations in physical invasion cases (making it
less likely a taking will be found); or (3) implement a combination of these.
In addition, a unified doctrine is attractive because it is theoretically coherent, and because it eliminates the "shoehorning" problems associated with
a per se rule.
The Court in Loretto wanted to make the point that the rights of possession, use, and alienation should be subject to special protection from the police
power.70 Viewing Penn Central as a case in which the police power was given
an expansive interpretation, the Court felt the need to construct a per se taking
rule that effectively rejected the Penn Centralbalancing approach. The Court
failed to recognize that by adopting a unified taking doctrine based upon the
Penn Central approach, it could accomplish its goal while reconciling the disparate treatment afforded owners affected by regulations and those owners affected by physical invasions. By remaining wedded to its two-track approach,
the Court has revitalized this treatment and further muddied the waters of
taking jurisprudence.
ROBERT

68. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
70. Loretto, 102 S.Ct. at 3176-77.

M.

DIGIoVANNI

Constitutional Law-Yfoungberg v. Romeo: Moving Toward a
Constitutional Right to Habilitation for the Mentally
Retarded
Since the 1960s the issue of the constitutional right to habilitation' for the

involuntarily committed mentally retarded 2 has created many confusing and
inconsistent decisions based on a wide range of theories. 3 While the lower
courts have exhibited a growing recognition of the constitutional right, 4 the

Supreme Court, when given the opportunity to resolve the dispute, has consist1. The American Psychiatric Association explains that the word "habilitation" is "commonly used to refer to programs for the mentally retarded because mental retardation is . . . a
learning disability and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 309 n.l (1982) (quoting Brief of American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 4 n.l.)
The concept of the right to habilitation first appeared in a thesis by Dr. Morton Birnbaum,
who argued that if society deprived an individual of his liberty in order to provide care and
treatment, courts should ensure that such treatment is provided. See Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960). Birnbaum's thesis gained judicial recognition in Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which Chief Judge Bazelon indicated, in
dicta, that lack of psychiatric treatment beyond custodial care raises serious constitutional
questions.
2. "Mental retardation," as defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency, "refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior and appearing in the 'developmental period.'" AMERICAN Ass'N ON
MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 5 (H. Grossman rev. ed. 1977). This definition encompasses three elements: to be classified

as mentally retarded a person must score below 97% of the population on a standardized intelligence test, lack the social skills to cope with his particular environment, and have been recognized
as having had problems of adaptive behavior since childhood or early adolescence. Herr, The New
Clients: Legal ServicesforMentally RetardedPersons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 555 (1979).
3. As Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir.
1966), denying the right to treatment for the civilly committed raises three possible constitutional
arguments: (I) violation of the due process of law since commitment is justified only because of its
humane, therapeutic goals; (2) violation of equal protection of the law when a mentally retarded
person charged with a crime is committed indefinitely, while others, convicted of the same offense,
are sentenced to a fixed term; and (3) violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment since the patient is committed indefinitely without treatment. Id.
4. The constitutional right to treatment for the mentally ill and mentally retarded has been
recognized by a number of federal courts. See, e.g., Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th
Cir. 1978) (finding a constitutional right to a safe and humane living environment); Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a person civilly committed to a state hospital
has a due process right to individualized treatment), vacatedon othergrounds, 432 U.S. 563 (1975);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,remanded in part,
decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
due process requires that civil commitment for reasons of mental retardation be accompanied by
minimally adequate treatment); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) (requiring the right to treatment for mentally handicapped in the least restrictive environment), afJd, 601
F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
judgment vacated and remandedforconsideration in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct, 3474
(1982); Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915
(N.D. Ohio 1980); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979); Eckerhart v. Hensley,
475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Steubig
v. Hammel, 446 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Penrhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 446
F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Eubanks v. Clarks, 434 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Morgan v.
Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
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ently avoided making the determination. In Youngberg v. Romeo 5 the Court

finally addressed the issue directly. In an opinion written by Justice Powell
and signed by seven other justices, 6 the Court recognized that these institution-

alized individuals have fourteenth amendment rights to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and

consequently, they are entitled to minimally adequate habilitation to protect
those constitutional guarantees. While stopping short of finding an independ-

ent constitutional right to treatment the Court moved one step closer to ensuring that the involuntarily committed mentally disabled will receive some form

of habilitation instead of mere custodial care.
In 1974 Nicholas Romeo, a profoundly retarded 7 twenty-six year old, was

involuntarily committed to Pennhurst state institution under the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966.8 After Romeo suffered

attacks by other patients and hospital staff, his mother filed an action as his
next friend for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 against the institution officials. She alleged that the institution's officials had denied Romeo's constitu-

tional rights to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraint,
and treatment.' 0 In addition, she claimed that the officials knew or should

have known about his injuries, but failed to take appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

In the ensuing trial the court instructed the jury that the eighth amendment
was the proper standard of liability,

1

and the jury returned a verdict for the

defendants.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the decision
5. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
6. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined
in Justice Powell's opinion. Justice Blacknun filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment and filed a separate
opinion. Id
7. Romeo "has the mental capacity of an eighteen month old child, with an I.Q. between 8
and 10. He cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills." Id at 309.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (Purdon 1969). The act provides in part that an individual
may be committed if he is "believed to be mentally disabled, and in need of care or treatment by
reasons of such mental disability." Id. (emphasis added).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides for damages when constitutional and statutory
rights have been infringed by state action.
10. Romeo used "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation." See Brief for Respondent
at 21-23, Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307.
It. The court instructed the jury that if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed
to take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo, such failure deprived him of his constitutional rights. Also, if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment as punishment for filing the lawsuit, his constitutional rights were violated under the
eighth amendment. Finally, the jury was instructed that only if they found the defendants deliberately indifferent to the serious medical and psychological needs of Romeo could they find that his
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights had been violated. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 312.
The Supreme Court adopted this "deliberate indifference" standard in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with the constitutional right of prisoners to be free from punishment that is "cruel and unusual" under the eighth amendment. Although the Youngberg trial did
not expressly refer to Estelle in charging the jury, the Supreme Court later found that the district
court had erroneously used the deliberate indifference standard adopted in that case. Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 312 n.l1.
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and remanded for a new trial.1 2 The court unanimously held that "the Eighth
Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of
crimes, was not an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed."1 3 The court was sharply divided, however, on the nature
of the substantive due process rights of the institutionalized mentally retarded.
The majority held that the fourteenth amendment generated three separate
constitutional rights. The right against undue bodily restraint1 4 and the right
to personal security and protection from harm,' 5 according to the court, were
"fundamental liberties" that could be limited only by an "overriding,
nonpunitive state interest."16 In addition, the court found that the involuntarily committed have a right to habilitation. To determine whether this constitutional guarantee had been violated, the court established a "sliding
t7
standard" that depended upon the severity of the intrusion.
On review the Supreme Court recognized that a person does not lose his
right to these substantive liberty interests merely because he has been committed under proper procedures.' 8 The Court dealt with two of these rights perfunctorily, since they "involve[d] liberty interests recognized by prior decisions
of [the] Court."' 9 In examining the constitutional right to personal security,
12. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 312, rev'g 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
13. Id The court of appeals also noted that since the reason for confining the mentally retarded is completely different from the reason for confining criminals, patients in an institution for
the mentally retarded have a right to be free from punishment. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 157-58.
14. The majority held that because physical restraint "raises a presumption of punitive sanction," Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 159, it can be justified only by a showing of "compelling necessity."
Id at 160. In addition, the court stated that the restraints used must be "the least restrictive
method of dealing with the patient, in light of his problems and the surrounding environment."

Id at 161.
15. The court of appeals found that a denial of this constitutional right could be justified only
by a showing of "substantial necessity." Id.at 164. According to Chief Judge Seitz, "substantial
necessity" was a more appropriate standard than the "compelling necessity" standard, which was
applied to the undue restraint claim, because:
[I]t enables a court and jury to distinguish between isolated incidents and inadvertent
accidents, on the one hand, and persistent disregard of patients' needs, on the other. If
the defendants disregarded plaintiffs injuries or failed to take steps to protect plaintiff,
then they should be liable unless they can offer explanations based on important state
interests.
Id
16. Id at 158.
17. Supreme CourtAffirms that Residents Have CertainInstitutionalRights, MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., July-August 1982, at 223. See Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 165-69. In his concurring
opinion, Chief Judge Seitz explained that all institutionalized mentally retarded are categorically
entitled to treatment unless there is a compelling explanation for the failure to provide it.
Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 174 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). The court further found that once some
treatment is provided, the fourteenth amendment requires that it be "acceptable . . .in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge." Id at 169. The concurring judges, however,
adopted a different standard of treatment, which was adopted by the Supreme Court. Id at 178
(Seitz, C.J., concurring). See supra note 28.
18. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980) ("A criminal
conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional
due process protection.").
19. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
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the Court relied on its earlier decision in Hutto v. Finney,20 which held that
imprisonment does not extinguish the right to personal security. The Court

reasoned that "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the invol-

untarily committed-who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions." 21 The Court applied similar reasoning to the right to freedom from

bodily restraint. Since this right survived criminal convictions and incarcera23
tion,22 the Court held that it survived involuntary commitment as well.

The Court found Romeo's claim to a constitutional right to habilitation

"more troubling." 24 Although it acknowledged that "a State is under no con-

stitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border,

25

the Court recognized that once a person is institutionalized, the state does have

a duty to provide certain services and care. 26 To diffuse the problem, it assumed from the record that Romeo only sought training related to the constitutional rights to personal security and freedom from restraint, and "not some
general constitutional right to training per se." 27 As a result, the Court limited

its holding to the particular circumstances of the case, requiring only that the

state provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure those constitutional rights.28 Further the Court found that the basic requirement of ad-

equacy is satisfied by providing "that training which is reasonable in light of
20. 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (affirming measures designed inter alia to protect prisoners from
rampant violence). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 425 U.S. 337 (1981) (inmates are constitutionally entitled to reasonable protection from harm, including protection from their fellow inmates).
21. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316-17.
22. "[L]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." Id at 316 (quoting
Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). See also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (liberty preserved by the due process clause
includes freedom from bodily restraint and punishment).
23. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
24. Id
25. Id at 317 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions)
and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (medical treatment)).
26. Id The state, however, has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope
of its responsibilities. Id See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (the Constitution
did not empower the Court to "second-guess" state officials charged with the responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare funds).
27. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318. In the district court, Romeo had asserted that "state officials
at a state mental hospital have a duty to provide residents... with such treatment as will afford
them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities permit." Id at 318 n.23 (citing Petition for Certiorari at 94A-95A,
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307). Later, Romeo not only dropped this assertion, but also "expressly
disavowed" any claim to treatment that would enable him "to achieve his maximum potential."
Id In his Supreme Court brief, Romeo indicated that "minimal habilitative efforts" were needed
to reduce his aggressive behavior. Id (citing Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Youngberg, 457 U.S.
307).
28. Id at 318-19. The Court apparently adopted the view expressed by Chief Judge Seitz in
his concurring opinion. Seitz stated "that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to minimally
adequate care and treatment." Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 176 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). The Court
noted that "Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable
safety and freedom from physical restraint--'the minimally adequate care and treatment' that
appropriately may be required for [the involuntarily committed individual]." Youngberg, 457
U.S. at 319.
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29
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of [each] case."

Given the Court's past record of side-stepping the right to habilitation
issue, it was not surprising that it failed to recognize an independent constitutional right to treatment for the involuntarily committed mentally retarded.
Several recent decisions evidence the reluctance to establish such a right on
either constitutional or statutory grounds. The most obvious instance of this
hesitation was O'Connor v. Donaldson,30 in which the Court expressly refused
to decide whether mentally ill persons have a right to treatment when confined
31

by the state.
In O'Connor the plaintiff had been civilly committed in 1957 to a state
hospital for "care, maintenance, and treatment,"' 32 but had received only custodial care until his release in 1971. 33 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that a person civilly committed to a state hospital had a due process right to
treatment based on two rationales. 34 The court's first rationale relied on the

rule established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana.3s The Court in

Jackson recognized that "due process requires that the nature and duration of

commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the indi29. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 n.25. The Court further noted that these liberty interests are
not absolute; that is, "the question . . . is not . . . whether a liberty interest has been infringed,
but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process." Id at 319-20. This determination depends on balancing the liberty interest of the involuntarily committed person against the legitimate interests of the state. The Court found that "this
balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or jury." Id at 321. Instead, the
Constitution requires only "'that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was
exercised.'" Id (quoting Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 178 (Seitz, C.J., concurring)). The Court ruled
that the decision by a professional is presumptively valid and that liability cannot be imposed
except when there is "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment." Id at 320-23. To support this limited judicial review, the Court, in an explanatory footnote, provided the following citations and quotations:
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979) (In limiting judicial review of medical
decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbant on courts to design procedures that
protect the rights of individuals without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the
states to deal with difficult problems."), see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, [352]
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive
to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
.
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system ....
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322 n.29.
30. 422 U.S. 563 (1975), vacating on other grounds, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Id at 573.
32. Id at 565-66.
33. Id at 569.
34. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson a mentally defective deaf mute was committed after the
court determined that he was incompetent to stand trial. The medical report showed that his
intelligence was not sufficient to enable him ever to develop the communication skills necessary to
understand the nature of the charges against him or to participate in his defense. Thus, it was
unlikely he would ever become competent to stand trial. The Supreme Court held that Indiana's
indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant based solely on his lack of capacity to stand trial
violated due process. The Court stated that such a defendant "cannot be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he
will attain [competency] in the foreseeable future." Id at 738. The Court added that even if it
were determined that the defendant was likely to become able to stand trial, "his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal." Id
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vidual is committed.

'36

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that if the state, under its

parenspatriae power, 37 commits a patient for the purpose of treatment but

does not provide treatment, then the nature of the commitment and the purpose of the commitment are not reasonably related. 38 Accordingly, the court

found that the state's commitment of the plaintiff in O'Connor violated the
constitutional rule of Jackson.

The second rationale relied on by the O'Connor Court made no distinction between persons committed under the state's parenspatriae power and
those committed under the state's police power. The Court recognized that

due process imposes specific limitations on the government's power to detain.39 When confinement occurs without these conventional limitations, as in
the involuntary commitment of the mentally disabled, the government must
extend a quidpro quo to justify the confinement. 40 According to the Fifth
Circuit, this quidpro quo for the confined retarded citizen is the provision of
rehabilitative treatment; when rehabilitation is impossible, the state must pro-

subsistence level
vide minimally adequate habilitation and care beyond 4the
1
custodial care that would be provided in a penitentiary.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court refused to examine either of the
36. Id at 738. The nature of the relationship between the government's action and its goals
is usually examined under the rational basis test. This test requires the one questioning the government action to demonstrate that the state does not have a legitimate interest that can be reasonably presumed to be advanced by the action in question. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
There are at least four purposes for involuntary civil commitment that clearly qualify as
legitimate, if not compelling, state interests: (1) to protect others from the dangerous committed
individual; (2) to protect the committed person from self-inflicted injury; (3) to protect the committed individual from passively harming himself; and (4) to provide needed treatment. Spece,
Preservingthe Right to Treatment: A CriticalAssessmentand ConstructiveDevelopment of ConstitutionalRight to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 6 (1978). See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493

F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing three purposes of involuntary commitment), vacated on
other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

37. Parenspatriaerefers to the sovereign's power of guardianship over disabled persons. For
a discussion of theparenspatriaepower, see B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL
PATIENTS 36-38 (rev. ed. 1978).

38. O'Connor, 493 F.2d at 521.
39. Id at 522. These limitations provide that the detention be in retribution for a specific
offense; that it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted only after a proceeding in which
fundamental procedural safeguards were observed. Id
40. Id
41. Id The seminal formulation of a constitutional right to habilitation based on the quidpro
quo theory appeared in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), enforced, 334 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1971),supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afT'd
inpart,remandedin part,decision reservedin partsub noma. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th

Cir. 1974). In Wyatt mentally retarded patients in an Alabama state hospital brought a class
action alleging that their constitutional rights to due process and protection against cruel and
unusual punishment had been violated because they were involuntarily confined for mental treatment purposes, but no such treatment had been given. The court emphasized that the patients
were involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures and without the constitutional protection afforded defendants in criminal proceedings. It concluded that "[w]hen patients are so
committed for treatment purposes, they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his
or her mental condition." Id at 784 (citing Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
and Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 196-7)). Speaking for the court, Chief Judge
Johnson stated that the failure to provide adequate treatment "violates the very fundamentals of
due process." Id at 782. See also Welsh v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (due process
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constitutional arguments advanced in O'Connor. Instead it cast its decision in
terms of the fourteenth amendment right to liberty.4 2 The Court determined
that a state could not constitutionally confine a nondangerous individual capable of surviving safely on his own or with the aid of family or friends. 43 While
the majority simply avoided the right to treatment issue, 4 4 Chief Justice Bur-

ger, in a critical concurring opinion, vehemently rejected the circuit court's
theory, contending that it was a "sharp departure from, and [could not] coexist
with, due process principles.

'45

In condemning the appellate court's quidpro

quo argument, he emphasized that "[t]he Court's opinion plainly gives no approval to that holding and makes clear that
it binds neither the parties to this
46
case nor the courts of the Fifth Circuit."

The Court has been equally reluctant to adopt a constitutional right to
treatment based on eighth amendment grounds. In a 1962 case, Robinson v.
Calfornia,47 the Court had held that any "punishment," whether criminal or

not, of certain personal statuses is inherently cruel and unusual. Proponents of
the eighth amendment argument thus contended that the mental illness or re-

tardation of a person who is either dangerous or in need of treatment is a
"status" to which the Robinson rule applies. 48 Consequently, courts have
found that civil commitment without treatment constitutes punishment that is
inherently cruel and unusual. 4 9 In Ingraham v. Wright 50 the Supreme Court
explicitly reserved the question whether involuntarily committed mental patients were entitled to eighth amendment protection. 5 1 Nevertheless, in holdrequires that civil commitment for mental retardation be accompanied by minimally adequate
treatment).
For a criticism of the quidpro quo theory, see Spece, supra note 36, at 10.
42. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
43. Id at 576.
44. Four days after deciding O'Connor, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in another Fifth
Circuit right to treatment case. Department of Human Resources v. Burnham, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975). In Burnham the district court had found no constitutional right to treatment. Burnham v.
Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The Fifth Circuit reversed on
the basis of its O'Connor decision. Even though the Supreme Court had vacated the O'Connor
decision, it denied certiorari in Burnham, apparently allowing Wyatt's holding of a constitutional
right to treatment to remain the law of the Fifth Circuit.
45. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 586 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
46. Id at 580.
47. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
48. InRobinson the Court found that a California statute that made narcotics addiction punishable by imprisonment inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Justice Stewart used the California legislature's own words in describing
narcotics addiction as a state similar to mental illness, that is, a "status" for which one should not
be punished. Id at 667 n.8.
49. The Court in Wyatt adopted this view when it stated that "[a]dequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because absent treatment, the hospital is transformed into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense." Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir.
1960)).
50. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
51. The Court stated:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be sufficiently
analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered
to justify application of the Eighth Amendment .... We have no occasion in this case,
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ing that the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment did not apply
to disciplinary corporal punishment in schools, the Court strongly suggested

that it would be hesitant to extend the Robinson rule to situations not involving criminal punishment. 52 The decision in Bell v. Wofish 5 3 reinforced this

position when the Court indicated that the eighth amendment is limited to
formally adjudicated crimes; therefore, the pretrial detainees in Bell did not

54
have eighth amendment protection.

Perhaps even more indicative of the Court's reluctance to find a right to

habilitation for the mentally retarded-either on constitutional or statutory
grounds-is PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman.5s The district
court in Pennhurst found that the conditions at Pennhurst violated the four-

teenth amendment due process right to minimally adequate habilitation in the
least restrictive environment, 56 the eighth amendment right to be free from
harm,5 7 and the fourteenth amendment equal protection right to be free from
nondiscriminatory habilitation. 58 More importantly, the court concluded that

habilitation could never be provided in the institution, 59 and thus ordered the
closing of Pennhurst and the placement of all its residents in community living
settings. 60 On appeal, the Third Circuit avoided the constitutional issue and
affirmed the lower court's decision solely on federal and state statutory

grounds. 6 1 The court found that the mentally retarded have a right to approfor example, to consider whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.
Id at 669 n.37.
52. In examining the history of the eighth amendment, the Ingraham Court noted that "the
Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes." Id at 664. See
also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1968) (refusing to apply the Robinson rule to punishment for drunkenness in a public place, because such punishment was punishment of the act, not
of a status).
53. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
54. Id at 535 n.16. "'[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the
Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law."' Id (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40).
The Third Circuit in Youngberg agreed that the eighth amendment was not an appropriate
source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 156.
The Supreme Court did not consider the eighth amendment argument. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307.
55. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See Note, Mental Heaith-Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman: Back to the DrawingBoardfor the Developmentally Disabled, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1116
(1982).
56. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
a~fd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
57. Id at 1320.
58. Pennhurst residents were held to have been denied education and training equal to that
received by other citizens because they were segregated in an institution that did not adequately
provide habilitation. Id at 1321-22.
59. Id at 1318. "[T]here is no question that Pennhurst, as an institution for the retarded,
should be regarded as a monumental example of unconstitutionality with respect to the habilitation of the retarded." Id at 1320.
60. Id at 1326.
61. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S.
1 (1981). The court considered the preferred order of determining the legal bases for relief to be
federal statutory grounds, state statutory grounds and then constitutional grounds. Id at 94. See
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
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priate treatment in the least restrictive environment under the Develop-

mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of631975 (DDA), 62 but
held that the DDA did not preclude institutionalization.

The Supreme Court avoided ruling on the constitutional issues, questions
presented under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,64 and Pennsylvania state law claims, 6 5 remanding these issues to the Third Circuit for
consideration. 66 It limited its decision to the review and interpretation of the
DDA, holding that the statute does not give the mentally retarded a right to

appropriate habilitation in the least restrictive environment. 67 Two primary
factors influenced the Court in reaching its decision. First, the Court noted
that "appropriate treatment in68 the least restrictive setting" would result in an
"enormous financial burden." Given Congress' limited funding to the states,
the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to repose an absolute obligation on the states to fund certain levels of treatment. 69 Second, the

majority expressed concern for states' rights, noting that imposing vague affirmative financial obligations on the states would upset the federal-state balance of power.70 Consequently, the Pennhurst Court held that the DDA
represents a general policy of preference for community alternatives to institutionalization, and thus merely encourages, rather than mandates, better care
for the mentally retarded. While the Court's concern for states' rights and
potential expense was restricted to the implementation of the DDA, it was
argubly no less influential in the Court's refusal to find an absolute and in-

dependent constitutional right to treatment in Youngberg.
Additional incentive to deny an independent constitutional right to habilitation lay in the Court's ability to rely on state law to provide a form of
. 62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The DDA claim was not raised in the
pleadings presented by the parties to the district court or in the original briefs filed on appeal. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing on the DDA. Pennhurst,451 U.S.
at 8 n.3.
63. Halderman, 612 F.2d at 107. The court reasoned that although the DDA disfavored institutionalization, the DDA recognized that, for some patients, habilitation could only occur during long-term hospitalization. Id For a discussion of the effect of Pennhurst on the DDA, see
Boyd, The Aftermath of the DDAct." Is ThereLffe Afier PennhursL$, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
448 (1981).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981). See infra note 94.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969) states that: "The department shall have
the power, and its duty shall be: (I) To assure within the state the . . .provision of adequate
mental health and mental retardation services for all persons who need them ....
66. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31.
67. ld Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. Id at 37-40
(White, J., dissenting). The dissenters' interpretation of the legislative history of section 6010 of
the DDA, which sets out a bill of rights for the mentally retarded, and the relative position of the
section within the Act, led them to conclude that section 6010 operates to create a conditional right
to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment. Id (White, J., dissenting). See 42
U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Note, Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 35 Sw. L.J. 959, 970 (1981). See also infra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
68. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24.
69. Id at 18.
70. Id at 15-18. See Note, supra note 67, at 968, 971.
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habilitative services for the institutionalized mentally retarded. 71 Most statutes have established a right to treatment 72 or a responsibility to provide habilitation. 73 To supplement these provisions, several states have explicitly
required the providing of habilitative services in the least restrictive environment 74 or of some individual rehabilitative plan. 75 Each of these statutes
could have been considered an alternative means of securing habilitative service for the mentally retarded citizen, thereby reducing the Court's incentive
76
to establish the constitutional right to treatment.
71. No state claim, however, was pled in Youngberg. See Second Amended Complaint in
Petition for Certiorari, Appendix at 86A-92A, Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307.
72. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2710.5-112 to -115 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18A-469 (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE
ANN., tit. 16, §§ 5502-5507 (Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 394.459 (West 1983); IDAHO CODE
§ 56-238 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-14-1.6.2 (Bums 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1981);
MONT. CODE ANN., § 53-21-142 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-9 (West 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. 122-55.6 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.85 (Page
1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27B-8-111 (1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, §§ 7,
11 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-50-11, -52-51 (1975 & Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 591002(i), -1009(i), -1009(a) (1971); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-4-1, -2 (1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 333
E-l, E-2 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 59A, § 2 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 2
(Michie/Law Co-op 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1116 (1980); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 13.01 (McKinney 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 50 (West 1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-2120 (Law Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-501 (1977); VA. CODE § 37.1-194 (1976 & Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.20.010 (1975).
74. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.551.01 (1982-1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 394.459 (West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-9 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A,
§§ 50, 93 (West 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-22-11 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-20
(Law Co-op. 1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, §§ 7, 11 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983);
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-40) (1980 & Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(3)(e) (West Supp. 19821983).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 394-459 (West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 2102(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12255.6 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.85 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27B-8-11
(1976); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9 (1980).
76. The Court's reluctance to find a federal remedy when a state remedy exists is illustrated
by its decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Parralt the Court concluded that
plaintiff, an inmate who had alleged that Nebraska prison officials had not delivered his mailordered packages, had not suffered a due process violation. First, the Court reasoned that the
negligent deprivation of property was not a result of some established state procedure, but the
unauthorized failure of state officials to follow established state procedure. Id at 543. Second,
and perhaps more important to the Youngberg Court, the Court in Parral noted that the state had
a tort claim procedure that provided a remedy to a person who had suffered a tortious loss at the
hands of the state. Id With the latter reason, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the fourteenth amendment is not intended to be a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may be administered by the States." Id (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
Although Parrat involved deprivation of property and not liberty, the Parratt Court relied
on two liberty cases to reach its decision, thereby indicating that its holding could have been
applicable to Youngberg. The court cited Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). At the time of the Youngberg trial, however, the statutory right to
habilitation for the involuntarily committed mentally retarded in Pennsylvania was uncertain and
subject to controversy. Finally, in 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in In re Schmidt,
494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981), that the state's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969), provided a right to habilitation. As a result,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated its December 1979 order in Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), which required state
and county officials to provide habilitation for mentally retarded citizens in the least restrictive
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Although the decision in Youngberg stopped short of adopting an independent constitutional right to treatment, the growing recognition of the capabilities of the mentally disabled by the lower courts, as well as the executive
and legislative branches, made it all but impossible for the Court to continue
to disregard altogether the right to treatment. In the last twenty years, retardation professionals have developed new methods for determining the capabilities of the most seriously disabled individuals. 77 As a result, a dramatic
reassessment of the learning potential of severely retarded individuals has occurred, producing extensive documentation of the improvements that can be
achieved by these individuals in self-help, language, and vocational skills
through appropriate instructional techniques. 78 Judicial recognition of these
abilities first appeared in Wyatt v. Stickney,79 which explicitly accepted that
habilitation of a mentally retarded person could "raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency." 80 Elaborating on the quidpro quo theory
expressed in Wyatt, the District Court of Minnesota in Welsch v. Likins s ' reaffirmed this judicial acceptance of the mentally retarded abilities. It noted that
"documentary evidence indicates that everyone, no matter the degree or severcapable of growth and development if given adequate and
ity of retardation, is 82
suitable treatment."
The district court in New York State Associationfor Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey83 also recognized the growth potential of the mentally retarded,
but unlike the court in Welsch, it established a right to habilitation based on a
protection from harm theory. In a preliminary court order 84 the court had
rejected the plaintiffs contention that residents of a state school for the mentally retarded had a constitutional right to treatment,85 but recognized the
environment. The Schmidt ruling, which verified the statutory right to treatment for the civilly
committed mentally disabled in Pennsylvania, and the Pennhurst order obviously alleviated, to
some extent, the pressure on the Court to find an independent constitutional right to habilitation
in Youngberg.
77. Berson & Landesman-Dwyer, Behavior Research in Severe and ProfoundMental Retardation (1955-1974), 81 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 428 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Bellamy, Peterson & Close, Habilitationof the Severely and Profoundl Retarded.IllustrationsofCompetence, 10 ED. AND TRAINING OF MENTALLY RETARDED 174 (1975); Booth,
Early Receptive Language Trainingfor the Severely and Profoundly Retarded, 9 LANGUAGE
SPEECH AND HEARING SERVICES INSCHOOLS 151 (1979); Murphy, Nunes & Hutchings-Ruprecht,
Reduction of StereotypedBehavior in Profoundly RetardedIndividuals, 82 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 238 (1977). See also Bronston, Matters of Design in ACHIEVEMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL
SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: TOWARD EXCELLENCE 7 (T. Appollini, J. Cappuccilli
& T. Cooke eds. 1980).
79. 334 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), a9'dinpart, remandedin part,decision reservedin part
sub non Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id at 395.
81. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (due process requires the state to provide the least
restrictive practical alternative).

82. Id at 495.
83. 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
84. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (ordering that certain remedial steps be taken to ensure minimally acceptable
living conditions for the residents).

85. Id at 758-64.
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state's constitutional duty to protect the residents from harm.8 6 Two years
later the court approved a consent decree 8 7 that required services well beyond

the protection from physical harm that the court had originally envisioned.
Although consent decrees usually have little precedential value, the court in

Carey enhanced the decree's impact by issuing a formal order ratifying it and
an additional memorandum discussing its constitutional basis.88 The court
noted that the decree was "based on the recognition that retarded persons,
regardless of the degree of handicapping conditions, are capable of physical,

intellectual, emotional and social growth, and.

. .

that a certain level of af-

firmative intervention and programming is necessary if that capacity for

growth is to be preserved, and regression prevented."8 9 Judge Orrin B. Judd,
speaking for the court, further explained that harm can result not only from

neglect but from conditions that cause regression or prevent development of

an individual's capabilities." 90 "Thus, what had been a right merely to be

protected from physical harm was transformed, by agreement of the parties,
into a right to at least a maintenance level of psychological treatment." 9 1
By the mid-1970s this judicial recognition of the mentally retarded's
growth potential had extended to the legislative branch.9 2 In 1975 Congress

93
passed the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
which stated that "treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with de-

velopmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental
potential of the person."' 94 To allow the mentally retarded to achieve the
greatest developmental potential, section 6010 of the Act further provided that

these services "should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the
person's personal liberty." 95 Until the Pennhurst decision, several courts reto recognize a right to treatment in the least restrictive
lied on this language
96
environment.

Three years after the passage of the DDA, President Carter proposed the
86. Id at 764-65. The court held that treatment could not be required since the state had no
affirmative obligation to provide services to its citizens. Id at 761-62. Nevertheless, the court
indicated that the state had an obligation not to worsen an individual's condition. Id at 761-65.
87. No. 72-C-356/357 (E.D.N.Y. April 30, 1975), reprintedin 1 MENTAL DISABtLITY L. REP.
58 (July/August 1976).
88. See Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715; see also Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, President's
Comm'n on Mental Health, MentalHealth and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panelon Legal
and EthicalIssues, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 49, 100 (1978).
89. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717.
90. Id at 718. Consequently, the right to minimally adequate treatment based on the right to
protection from harm as expressed in Youngberg is more limited than the right to treatment described in Carey. The Youngberg Court limits the right to treatment that is necessary to protect
the individual against physical harm. The New York district court, however, provided a higher
standard of treatment, one that protects the individual from mental and physical regression.
91. Spece, supra note 36, at 29.
92. S. REP. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. RP. No. 58, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
reprintedin 1975 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 919 (1975); 124 CONG. REC. 16,516-17 (1975) (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
94. Id at § 6010(2).
95. Id
96. See, e.g., Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), aft'd, 605 F.2d 586 (lst
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Mental Health Systems Act (MHSA) to promote the deinstitutionalization of
the mentally disabled and provide them with appropriate community services. 97 The passage of the MHSA, in 1980, provided grants to assure the initiation and improvement of comprehensive mental health services within the
community for chronically mentally ill individuals. In addition, the MHSA
provided that a person admitted to a facility for the purpose of receiving
mental health services should be accorded "[t]he right to appropriate treat-

ment and related services in a setting and under conditions that are the most
supportive of such person's personal liberty"9 s as well as "[t]he right to a humane treatment environment that affords reasonable protection from harm." 99
More importantly, however, the MHSA recognized that the committed men-

tally disabled should have an:
individualized, written, treatment or service plan . . . the right to

treatment based on such plan, the right to periodic review and reassessment of treatment and related service needs, and the right to ap-

propriate revision of such plan, including any revision necessary to
provide a description of mental health services that may be needed
after such person is discharged from such program or facility. 100
Implicit in this latter provision is the belief that, given adequate treatment, the
skills of the mentally disabled can improve, especially outside the large institution. Nevertheless, the MHSA still does not provide a statutory right to treatment for the committed mentally retarded. At best, it only strongly
recommends that treatment be provided to these committed individuals. Fur-

thermore, since the MHSA is limited in scope to those hospitals actually receiving federal aid through the MHSA grant program, this "recommended
treatment" only benefits those mentally disabled individuals who, by chance,
are being treated at a MHSA hospital.
Cir. 1979) (summary judgment denied since complaint stated facts that could establish a violation
of statutory right).
Arguably section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981), and its regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1982), also impose an obligation on state officials to provide adequate
treatment in the least restrictive environment. In enacting section 504, Congress, in effect, codified
the constitutional right to equal protection for the physically and mentally handicapped. Regulation 84.22(b) later provided that "[iln choosing among readily available methods for making programs and activities readily accessible to the handicapped, a recipient shall give priority to those
methods that offer programs and activities to handicapped persons in the most integrated setting
approprite." In view of the Act's provisions, the district court in Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a2 7'd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981), found that the segregation of the retarded in an isolated institution such as Pennhurst, where the habilitation provided did not meet minimally adequate standards, violated a
federal statutory right to habilitation in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id at 1323. The district
court in Pennhurst, however, is apparently the only court to have explicitly accepted this argument. See Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Corn, 674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding
that section 504 does not prohibit all institutionalization, but refusing to decide whether it requires
treatment in the least restrictive environment); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981)
(the Rehabilitation Act cannot be construed so broadly as to require treatment in a community
setting).
97. S. 1177, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 9707-20 (daily ed. July 24, 1980). The bill
was passed and is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9401-9523 (Supp. V 1981).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9501(l)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1981).
99. Id at § 9501(l)(G).
100. Id at § 9501(l)(B).
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Faced with the emerging awareness of the capacities of the mentally retarded, the Court had to begin facing the right to treatment issue. Its "minimally adequate" standard, based on the liberty interests, however, falls far

short of the standards established by Congress and the lower courts. Such
minimum habilitative efforts, while reducing the individual's aggressive and

self-destructive tendencies, do not necessarily ensure that the involuntarily
committed mentally disabled person will maintain even the basic self care
skills possessed when he entered a state institution.' 0 1 Extensive evidence indicates that residents of institutions suffer decreases in such significant areas as
10 2
"intelligence quotient, motor skills, social competence, and verbal skills."

This decrease in functional level is the result of lack of stimulation and prac-

tice in using already acquired skills. Experts contend that when adequate
treatment is not given, mentally retarded individuals, confined to an institu-

to improve their ability to function,
tion because they are thought too 0helpless
3
actually learn helplessness there.'
The Court is not completely unaware of this unfortunate result. As Jus-

tice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion, 1 4 when such skills are lost,
the mentally retarded person has arguably suffered "a loss of liberty quite dis-

tinct from-and as serious as-the loss of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints."' 0 5 The willingness of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
O'Connor to "listen seriously to [such] an argument"' 1

6

is a clear indication

that another decision concerning the constitutional right to rehabilitation may
be forthcoming. If the Court does redefine the right as an independent constitutional guarantee, however, it may be expected still to refuse to establish a
right to treatment that will preserve basic self-care skills. Such a decision,
while bringing the Court yet one step closer to the requirements intended by
101. See Guthrie, Butler & Gorlow, PersonalityDifferences Between Institutionalizedand Noninstitutionalized Retardates, 67 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 543 (1963); Mitchell & Smeriglio,
Growth in Social Competence in Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Children, 74 AM. J. MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 666 (1970); Vogel, Kun, & Meshorer, Effects of EnvironmentalEnrichment and EnvironmentalDeprivation on Cognitive Functioningin InstitutionalizedRetardates,31 J. CONSULTING
PSYCH.

570 (1967).

102. Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due ProcessRights and TheirApplication, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 183 (1978). See also Lyle, The Effect of an InstitutionalEnvironment
Upon the VerbalDevelopment ofImbecile Children-Part11,4 J.MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH
1, 9-12 (1960); Schlanger, Environmental Influences on the Verbal Output of Mentally Retarded
Children, 19 J.SPEECH & HEARING DISORDERS 339 (1954); Vogel, Kun, & Meshorer, supra note
101.
103. The term "learned helplessness" has been used to describe the process by which institutionalized residents become functionally incapacitated. DeVellis, Learned Helplessness in Institutions, 15 MENTAL RETARDATION, Oct. 1977, at 10. See also N. HOBBS, THE FUTURES OF
CHILDREN 124-55 (1975); Lyle, supra note 102.
concurring). The concurring opinion was also
104. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 325 (Blackmun, J.,
signed by Justices Brennan and O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurring
opinion. He agreed with the Court "that some amount of self-care instruction may be necessary to
avoid unreasonable infringement of a mentally retarded person's interests in safety and freedom
from restraint." Id at 330 (Burger, C.J., concurring). He concluded, however, "that the Constitution does not otherwise place an affirmative duty on the State to provide any particular kind of
training or habilitation--even such as might be encompassed under the essentially standardless
rubric 'minimally adequate training,' to which the Court refers." Id
105. Id at 327.
106. Id at 329.
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Congress and the lower courts, would nevertheless fail to recognize the maximum potential of the mentally retarded.
LEIGH L. PURYEAR

